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Abstract
This paper starts from administrative power and 
administrative system and believes that the tradition of 
administrative power, administrative power distribution 
and operation system, administrative power self-isolation 
and alienation tendencies, administrative structure and 
traditional bureaucratic system have a significant impact 
on the construction of open government information 
system. At the same time, it analyzes the beneficial 
factors to the open government information and 
believes that the proposal of modern concept of national 
governance, the construction and continuous practice 
of relative centralization of government power system 
and the continuous development of e-government will 
contribute to the development of open government 
information.
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INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that government information reflects 
some power. Open government information means that 
part of the unique power of the Government will be 
digested in society and among individuals in an open 
way and part of the power which should be exercised 
by the government will be eliminated after opened and 
transferred into power operated in a social or civic self-
determination way.1 Government information and power 
are born with inherent relationship. The various obstacles 
in the operation of open government information 
mechanism of nature are the reflection of mutually 
unsuited situation between the original power system and 
open government information power digestion. Thus, 
the exploration of the cause of the problems in open 
government information is inseparable from the analysis 
of the problem of the current distribution of administrative 
power and its operational mechanism. Meanwhile, the 
power distribution system and its operational mechanism 
determine the composition and mode of operation of 
China’s administrative system. From this perspective, 
the exploration of problems in open government 
information is also inseparable from the analysis of the 
institutional framework of the current administrative 
organization. Administrative power and administrative 
system have deeply influenced the practice of open 
government information. To really achieve the purpose 
of open government information, while improving open 
government information legislation, we must re-organize 
and re-review China’s administrative power and relative 
problems of administrative system. This is the foundation 
and premise to construction open government information 
system in China. 
1 Of course, not all government information disclosure will lead to 
the disappearance of government power, but it is undeniable that 
through open government information, matters which previously 
need to be led or guided by the government may be achieved by 
social or individual citizens’ self-determination. Thus, to some 
extent, government power would no longer intervene in such 
matters.
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1. ANALYSIS OF OPEN GOVERNMENT 
I N F O R M A T I O N  U N D E R  T H E 
PERSPECTIVE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
POWER 
1.1 Administrative Power Configuration
As mentioned earlier, open government information on 
nature is to digest part of original administrative power 
in society and individuals. Therefore, open government 
information relates to the configuration of governmental 
power and the smooth operation of open government 
information is inseparable from scientific analysis of 
administrative power configuration. The configuration 
problem of government power mainly includes three 
aspects:  i t  f irst  reflects in the definit ion of the 
relationship between the government and the market. 
The relationship between the government and the market 
on nature is reflected in the boundary and scope of 
government power. Overall, China’s government is 
currently in full exit status with the aim to play a greater 
basic role of the market in resource allocation and reduce 
unnecessary government intervention. Less approval and 
licensing procedures and the transfer from a focus on ex 
ante regulatory supervision to post supervision are 
specific reflections. However, while the government is 
gradually loosening the control over the market, there 
are also phenomena in which the government has stuck 
at where it should have quit or it has quit at where it 
should not. The boundary between the government and 
the market needs to be defined more scientifically. 
Second, it is reflected in the longitudinal power 
distribution, i.e. the decentralization between the central 
and local government. As this issue is concerned, our 
country has the problem of high concentration of 
administrative power. “In the internal administrative 
power system, administrative power is highly centralized 
from local governments to the central government, from 
the lower level of government to the higher levels of 
government and from administrative organizations and 
specific staff members to the executive head. The 
centralization of administrative power is a longitudinal 
centralization, reflecting the relationship between all 
levels of government and between governmental 
organizations and staff and the executive heads in the 
operation of administrative power. in relation to the 
central government and the higher levels of government, 
local governments and lower levels of government lack 
complete organizational executive power and financial 
power and they only have limited legislative power (and 
not all local governments are vested with executive 
legislative power), ...” (Shi, 2010) China’s administrative 
power in longitudinal distribution is mainly presented as 
“top-heavy” structure. With the higher administrative 
level ,  they have the greater  power.  The central 
government has greater power and local governments 
have limited power. Finally, it is reflected in the 
transverse power distribution, i.e. power segmentation 
between transverse sectors. From the transverse aspect, 
the power of administrative bodies at the same level is 
very dispersed and law enforcement functions of 
different administrative departments overlap. The 
operating mechanism of China’s administrative power is 
the product of the almighty country. The highly dense 
state power network covers every corner of the society 
(Liu, 2010). With the advent of the administrative state, 
administrative power penetrates into all areas of society 
on a larger scale and it becomes dispersed. Our current 
power configuration and partitioning mechanism have a 
close relationship to government information and has 
had a major impact on our open government information. 
Mapping the three problems to open government 
information domain, first the boundary issue between the 
government and the market is related to the control 
subject and information flow issues. The government 
and the market are in a dynamics relation to each other. 
The larger the boundary of government power becomes, 
the free work space of the market would be compressed; 
the smaller the boundary of government power becomes, 
the greater the free space of market operation will be. 
However, what history teaches us is that the border of 
the government and the market should be reasonably 
defined and neither can be neglected or become extreme. 
In our case, although the state government is in an exit 
status, the overall administrative power operation 
boundary power is too large and the market is under 
government control and repression for a long time. In 
such an environment, when the government is in 
intervention in the market economic order and social 
order, because of the leading and dominant position of 
its powers, the vast majority of information generated in 
the process will be controlled by the government. 
Information generated in the market and in society, 
because of government intervention, with power 
operat ion as  i t s  tools  and ins t ruments ,  wi l l  be 
incorporated into government information category even 
when a lot of information should not be part of 
government information and this will reduce the total 
amount of the free market information flow. Information 
overly held in government’s hands will become hidden 
information and that is not conducive to market players 
to grasp and control information. The more closely 
power and information combine, the more likely that the 
information will become secrecy. Since Government 
Information Disclosure Ordinance was promulgated 
2008, our government information disclosure application 
has surged year after year, which in essence reflects that 
in the long-term government-led market environment, 
the information is mainly controlled by the government 
and the free market information is very limited. Once we 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Analysis on Open Government Information Under the 
Perspective of Administrative Power and Administrative System
16
give civil and social citizens the right to apply for 
opening government information, the market and the 
community have shown tremendous demand for 
information. From another point of view, through the 
disclosure of government information, government 
information is disclosed to society or individuals. This 
wil l  ful ly  play the serving role  of  government 
information in people’s production life and economic 
society, reflect government decentralization to market, 
gradually reducing control of the market and will further 
promote the rational construction of the border between 
government power and operation of the market. 
Moreover, open government information will change the 
traditional practice of government-led information flow. 
Giving citizens the right to apply for disclosing 
government information and the government disclosing 
information as applied will promote the free flow of 
information, show the value and utility of information in 
the market in a greater degree and enhance the vitality of 
the market. Also on the decentralization of central and 
local government, the excessive concentration of power 
of the central government is not conducive to carry out 
the work of open government information. We must 
recognize that the higher the rank of power is, the closer 
it comes to the core national interests and it will also be 
more inclined to secrecy. Compared with interests in 
high-rank power, lower rank of power is farther from 
core national interests and easier to open. Currently, our 
administrative power longitudinal decentralization 
demonstrates that the central power is too much strong, 
causing the result that the central government control 
greater information and the information distribution is an 
inverted triangle shape. With the exception that the 
central government information is more sensitive, the 
ability of the central government to respond to the 
demands of citizens is slower than local governments. 
Therefore, the current mechanism of longitudinal 
decentralization of power has centralized powers which 
can be handed over local government to the central 
government, leading to poor disclosure of government 
information. This is not conducive to the maximization 
and the timeliness of government information disclosure. 
In terms of future, we need further division of the 
administrative authority of central and local government, 
give greater powers to local governments and fully play 
the initiative of local governments in the government 
information disclosure. Finally, from the horizontal 
fragmentation of government power, the current division 
of executive power is in lateral decentralization and the 
overlapping of administrative powers is serious, resulting 
in disperse of distribution of government information. 
The  co r r e spond ing  s t a tu s  o f  i n fo rma t ion  and 
administrative power is one to many. Because of this, we 
must spend a certain amount of time and cost in the 
government information disclosure process to coordinate 
government information disclosure. This issue will be 
discussed in depth in the administrative system 
part.
1.2 Highly Authoritative, Monopolized and 
Closed Traditional Administrative Power 
Culture has an important role on the construction of 
a system. Our long-term prevailing culture of secrecy 
has a significant impact on the construction of our 
administrative power system and its exercise. This is 
mainly reflected in the absolute authority, independence 
and closeness of traditional administrative power 
(Guan, 2011). Its authority, monopoly, closeness 
is mainly reflected in the following aspects: First, 
the administrative bodies are unitary. As the only 
executive bodies, administrative agencies in this single 
administrative body system construction, “with the 
central authority at the center, emphasize obedience 
of local government to the central government and 
emphasize society’s dependence on the government. The 
exercise of power is in one-way, which is command, 
obedience and control. The supply of the executive 
entity system is completely monopolized by the central 
government.” (Xue, 2007) Under a single administrative 
body system, the administrative power is considered as 
a privilege of the government and it is not allowed to 
be shared and divided. Second, from the perspective of 
the relationship between administrative power and other 
power, the exercise of administrative power is relatively 
independent. On the one hand, the absolute authority of 
administrative power excludes the question of the public 
on administration authority, such as the qualitative 
characteristics of administrative acts. On the other 
hand, the administrative power is in a stronger position 
compared with judicial power. Prior to 1989, China’s 
administrative power was not subject to judicial control. 
With the promulgation of the 1989 Administrative 
Procedure  Law ,  t he  admin i s t r a t ive  powers  o f 
administrative agencies have been incorporated into the 
judicial review system. However, because traditionally 
in the system judiciary agencies are weak and they are 
heavily dependent on the local government in financial 
and other aspects, the effect of judiciary agencies 
in overseeing administrative powers is not obvious. 
Meanwhile, the exercise of the administrative acts is 
related to professional and technical aspects. In order to 
better promote the administrative power to serve public 
interests, administrative powers enjoy greater discretion 
in the exercise process, which further increases the 
difficulty of controlling the administrative power. The 
judiciary agencies are often reluctant to change the 
administrative acts that an administrative organ has 
made. Third, the exercise process of administrative 
power is very closed. On the one hand, during the 
exercise of administrative power, the decision-making, 
execution and supervision and other related aspects are 
controlled in the same hands of administrative organs 
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and they are not separated. Various aspects are in the 
internal closed administrative organ system, with greatly 
closeness. On the other hand, the exercise procedures 
of administrat ive power are quite arbitrary and 
secrecy. Before the introduction of the Administrative 
Punishment Law, in the exercise of administrative 
power, administrative authorities do not undertake the 
obligations to inform the administrative relative person 
the administrative penalty facts, reasons and the basis, 
which reflect the secrecy of the exercise of power. From 
the analysis of the traditional power we can find that, 
in terms of administrative power, in the absence of 
effective institutional constraints, administrative power 
tended to run in a self-enclosed status. The disclosure of 
government information has to get rid of this tendency 
to be closed so that the power can be run in the sunshine. 
The two will inevitably conflict with each other
1.3 The “Alienation” of Administrative Power 
Publicity is undoubtedly the most fundamental attribute 
of administrative power. According to the social 
contract theory point of view, in order to protect their 
own interests, people will build contracts to transfer 
part of their rights to form their own country. The state 
administrative authority should reflect its public nature 
to promote the growth of the public interest of the 
community. In order to effectively exercise executive 
power, executive power is bound to be allocated 
vertically and horizontally to national servant staff at 
different positions. When National servant staff has the 
status of civil servants, they also have the individual 
“private” identity in society. According to public choice 
theory, public officials in politics are like rational 
people in market economy and they will choose the 
most favorable behavior, especially when the oversight 
mechanisms are inadequate, alienation of administrative 
power becomes possible and practical (liu, 2005). On the 
so-called alienation of administrative power, scholars 
have different opinions, but they all reveal its nature: 
That is, the departure of administrative authority from its 
public nature, tending to privatization and authorization. 
Therefore, in essence, alienation of administrative power 
means it violates the original intention power players 
when they establish certain rights and violates the 
purpose of transferring the rights of the public, resulting 
that administrative power cannot serve public interests 
and hinder the protection and realization of rights of the 
public (Kong, 2012). The concentrated expression is that 
administrative interests are turned to departments and 
administrative interests are privatized. Administrative 
interests turning to departments make the ultimate 
destination of administrative powers is set to promote the 
interest growth of their own administrative departments, 
which is a manifestation of small collectivism. The 
privatization of administration interests means the 
executive staff abuses the executive power on their 
hand for personal gains. This is personal corruption. 
It can be said that it is the unadjusted contradiction 
between the publicity of administrative power and the 
privatization of administrative power interests that plays 
an important role in hindering government information 
disclosure. Under the existing uncompleted mechanisms, 
the administrative interests turning to departments and 
its privatization have occurred more or less. Facing open 
government information, the administrative organs will 
inevitably show some resistance. “Sunshine is the best 
preservative”. Open government information will lead to 
the phenomenon that administrative interests are turned 
into departments and privatized have nowhere to hide. 
From this perspective, open government information will 
greatly reduce the phenomenon of administrative interests 
turning to departments and its privatization, making 
the exercise of administrative power return to its public 
nature.
2. ANALYSIS OF OPEN GOVERNMENT 
I N F O R M A T I O N  U N D E R  T H E 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
SYSTEM 
2.1 Decentralized Administrative Bodies 
Administrative power configuration determines the 
settings of administrative bodies. Administrative body 
setting and administrative power configuration have a 
high degree of uniformity and consistency. From the 
settings of administrative bodies in China, the current 
configuration of power in China is decentralized and the 
cross-overlap is serious, resulting in decentralization of 
lateral administrative bodies and serious overlapping 
functions.  At the same t ime,  as the exercise of 
administrative power is professional and special, the 
settings of administrative bodies in China present a 
“fragmented” situation. Administrative institutions 
are too decentralized. Different information is in the 
hands of different administrative bodies, but due to the 
overlapping functions of administrative bodies, this means 
different administrative bodies need cooperation in the 
government information disclosure process. On the one 
hand, administrative bodies are too scattered and they 
have information communication problems between each 
other. There are information barriers between government 
agencies. On the other hand, from the perspective of 
citizens to apply for government information, in the 
information disclosure process, the cooperation time the 
government spends brings inefficiency for information 
applicants. To some extent, this can be understood as an 
undue infringement information for citizens’ information 
application rights. China’s Government Information 
Disclosure Ordinance Article VII provides that, “the 
administrative bodies should establish and improve 
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the coordination of government information release 
mechanism. When government information released by 
administrative agencies involves other administrative 
organs, they shall communicate and confirm with the 
relevant administrative authorities to ensure the released 
government information is accurate and consistent.” This 
coordination release mechanism which does not change 
the original administrative system is a stopgap measure, 
and it cannot completely solve the problem. The key is 
to re-review our current “fragmented” administrative 
institutional structure and build reasonable administrative 
institutional bodies to truly promote the efficiency of open 
government information.
2.2 Defects of the Traditional Bureaucratic 
System
To achieve effective management of the state over the 
community, a state exists as an abstract entity in nature 
and the state power works on the community in the way 
of entitle administrative bodies at different levels in 
different areas administrative powers. This constitutes 
the administrative status of institutional mechanisms in 
China. Meanwhile, in order to achieve reasonable and 
effective functioning in internal administrative bodies, 
hierarchical bureaucracy comes into being. According to 
the opinions of Marx Weber, bureaucracy has the merit 
of the best technology, reasonable and effective division 
of labor and impersonal organization and management 
and so on (Bao, 2006). Through an organized authority 
and institutional operation system, we can set up an 
administrative system. Traditional bureaucracy, to some 
extent, has promoted the efficiency of administrative 
power. But at the same time due to its high centralization 
and relative closeness, it is mutually exclusive with 
the disclosure of government information. As Weber 
once said, “All bureaucracies are trying to keep internal 
information and motivation confidential to increase 
its authority. Bureaucratic administrations always tend 
to secret management. For now, they try to hide their 
information and behavior to prevent comment and 
criticism.” 2 In our case, our bureaucracy is such a typical 
bureaucracy of this kind of bureaucratic system: Chief 
responsible system, severe dependency of lower levels to 
higher levels of officials, clear hierarchy and unreasonable 
evaluation and accountability mechanisms and so on. 
This highly centralized and tightly closed administrative 
bureaucracy constitutes an “organized secrecy”. It is this 
organized secrecy mechanism that increases the difficulty 
of open government information, The exclusion of open 
government information is not loose behavior; however, it 
has formed a structural disorder in the current organization 
2 Refer to Susan Nevelow, Tom Ginsburg:[Dis-]Informing the 
people’s Discretion: Judicial Deference Under the National Security 
Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act, Administrative Law 
Review, fall 2014，Number 4.
of the administrative bureaucracy. However, reflecting the 
government information disclosure, we can effectively 
reduce the impact of this hierarchy. We know that in order 
to achieve the maintenance of this kind of bureaucratic 
organizations, tendentious information flow is necessary. 
Reasonably embedding the information controlled and 
saved by this organization into well-set administrative 
bureaucracy and consciously controlling the flow of 
inside information will further strengthen the firmness of 
bureaucracy. However, by open government information 
approaches, the government cannot dominate the flow 
of information. What’s more, if we open other relevant 
information to the public indifferently, this will gradually 
narrow the information difference between the relevant 
agencies so that the whole administrative bureaucracy 
and the community as a whole present a more flat state, 
which helps break the current shortcomings of China’s 
administrative bureaucracy.
SUMMARY
The smooth development of open government information 
should not only focus on the system construction of open 
government information; at the same time, we should 
analyze it in the entire administrative system and power 
structure. Although the current administrative system 
and administrative power configuration present a variety 
of issues, yet the proposal of state governance system 
modernization objectives, the relative concentration 
of administrative permission and punishment system 
practices and the development of e-commerce will enable 
the government information disclosure system of our 
country to move towards in a more favorable direction.
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